2008-09-09 What Makes People Vote Republican/woozle

From Issuepedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Analysis

Preface

This post is mainly about an article written by Jonathan Haidt, but adding two things:

  • Focus on the two paragraphs beginning with "A Durkheimian ethos...", implying that they are of particular interest
  • The parting "You might even conclude, as I suspect Haidt does, that Republican voters tend to be more nuanced and sophisticated than Democratic voters."

If we're talking about the validity of Barone's post, then, we're mainly talking about the validity of Haidt's article (with emphasis on those two paragraphs) plus Barone's additional parting shot.

Haidt: introduction

The first hint of trouble (i.e. anything that I can disagree with) is when Haidt says:

People vote Republican because Republicans offer "moral clarity" – a simple vision of good and evil that activates deep seated fears in much of the electorate. Democrats, in contrast, appeal to reason with their long-winded explorations of policy options for a complex world.

The first sentence isn't the problem; it is pretty clearly true that the US Republican brand of conservatism does just that -- present the world in simple, easy-to-digest terms which exploit people's fears for illicit gain. Clearly Haidt is suggesting that the problem with the US Democratic brand of liberalism, then, is that it chooses not to hide the complexity -- thus turning off conservative sympathies. The implied criticism would seem to be not with the integrity or value of Democratism/liberalism, but with its presentation -- its marketing.

So Haidt is, presumably, going to give us some good advice for how to better market liberalism, which he has just stated is more honest than conservatism, right? Let's read on...

"Diagnosis is a pleasure," continues Haidt, "...but with pleasure comes seduction, and with righteous pleasure comes seduction wearing a halo. Our diagnosis explains away Republican successes while convincing us and our fellow liberals that we hold the moral high ground. Our diagnosis tells us that we have nothing to learn from other ideologies..."

Now hold on a minute, buckaroos. A core part of liberalism is the idea that other ways and traditions may have value. Liberalism embraces the idea of diversity. You can't tell me, who has spent the past 6 months as a "rational liberal" debating political philosophy with a "progressive conservative", that I'm not trying to see the good in conservatism.

If anyone is rejecting the idea of learning from other ideologies, it would be conservatives. If conservatism chooses to shoot itself in the foot by insisting on an all-or-nothing, dominate-or-be-dominated view of the political spectrum, that is a choice made by conservatives -- not liberals. Conservatism clearly cannot win on those terms, and conservatives must learn to accept -- permanently -- the liberal ideas of diversity and tolerance if their philosophy is going to survive. This isn't a matter of liberalism "winning" on some "liberal talking point"; it's a matter of getting along peacefully.

Haidt loses 2 points: one for the straw man attack on liberalism, and one for using appeal to guilt based on that fallacy.

Haidt concludes this thought by continuing:

...and it blinds us to what I think is one of the main reasons that so many Americans voted Republican over the last 30 years: they honestly prefer the Republican vision of a moral order to the one offered by Democrats. To see what Democrats have been missing, it helps to take off the halo, step back for a moment, and think about what morality really is."

Aside from the "halo" swipe, he seems to be getting back on firmer ground: where have Democrats gone wrong in being persuasive to those more inclined to vote Republican? Republicans, says Haidt, want their argument framed in terms of morality -- so we need to have a better understanding of what that is.

Haidt: morality

First, Haidt rejects the idea that morality is solely about "how we treat each other", citing as examples ancient "rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom". This makes some rather questionable assumptions:

  • That these laws were considered "morals" at the time, rather than just "laws" -- rules which people felt compelled to obey, rather than rules which most people agreed were right
  • That morality worked the same way in ancient times as it does now (I don't think so; many of those laws seem pretty bizarre and often downright immoral to me, so if they accurately represent the morality of the time, we must have matured a lot since then)

Haidt adds that "There is no rational or health-related way to explain these laws.". Okay, so what is the reason for them? Oh, wait, he said there is no rational way to explain them. So they were totally arbitrary. Got it. Moving on...

Haidt then advances the hypothesis that these laws were drawn up on the basis of what an ancient cleric might have found to be "disgusting". (Hmm, I thought he said there was no rational way to explain them. Surely if you're a powerful priest, and something disgusts you, you would quite reasonably want to outlaw it, being ancient and everything, and not really knowing any better or having any reason to question one's ideas, since liberalism hadn't been invented yet. So is Haidt excluding emotion as a possible motivator for rational action, here?)

Haidt then tested this hypothesis for his dissertation, where he "made up stories about people who did things that were disgusting or disrespectful yet perfectly harmless." What he found was that most people agreed that the actions were wrong even though nobody was harmed -- which, he argues, supports his hypothesis that morality is not (or not entirely) based on avoidance of harm to others.

What it suggests to me is that most people don't think these things through very carefully. Just because most people don't know the reasons why they do or believe things doesn't mean there wasn't originally a reason, nor does it mean that "going along" with them for the sake of social harmony is irrational.

Let's take a look at some the examples he cites:

  • "a woman ... can't find any rags in her house so she cuts up an old American flag and uses the pieces to clean her toilet, in private": Knowing that many people are very attached to the flag, it would arguably be emotionally hurtful to them to willfully destroy one in a way that seems disrespectful. Also, some people might assume that any such destruction was a political statement against America; whether or not this is true, it would be a bad idea to accidentally create such an impression. (The question of whether these feelings about a piece of colored cloth are rational is a separate discussion.)
  • "a family whose dog is killed by a car, so they dismember the body and cook it for dinner": There are all kinds of flaws with this as an example supporting Haidt's point. First of all, some cultures do eat dog meat (what was that about liberals believing "that we have nothing to learn from other ideologies", Dr. Haidt?). People in such cultures are probably familiar with the proper preparation of such meat, and would therefore know how to do it safely. Their culinary practices have been through the filter of long experience with dog meat, and so are more likely to be safe than those some American suburban family which is used to buying USDA-inspected Grade A meat from the store.

Most (how many?) of the respondents agreed that the actions were "morally wrong" although "nobody was harmed". (Is it really fair to say that "nobody was harmed" in a hypothetical example where the risks aren't even discussed? Would it be "morally wrong" to drive a child-filled schoolbus at 90 MPH towards a cliff, as long as you slam on the brakes in time to prevent it from actually going over?)

In any case, Haidt draws the following conclusions:

  • "when gut feelings are present, dispassionate reasoning is rare", and people will exert great efforts "to fabricate harmful consequences that could justify their gut-based condemnation."
    • There is nothing wrong with this, on the face of it. Haidt further concludes "If people want to reach a conclusion, they can usually find a way to do so. The Democrats have historically failed to grasp this rule, choosing uninspiring and aloof candidates who thought that policy arguments were forms of persuasion." So now we're back in the territory where Haidt could be offering suggestions to make the liberal message more viscerally appealing -- although one might almost think he is criticizing the Democrats for using "policy arguments" -- he must be using a different meaning of the phrase than I'm aware of, because calling something "morally wrong/right" is also a policy argument, it's just not one based in rationality.
    • One is forced to conclude that he is saying that Dems need to use fewer rational arguments and more appeals to emotion in their arguments. While this might be more successful at grabbing conservative ears, wouldn't it also be somewhat dishonest? And from a purely amoral/strategic point of view, wouldn't this be allowing the terms of the argument to be determined by conservatives, who specialize in such arguments and have staked out their territory almost exclusively on the basis of whether it can be phrased in such emotionally-appealing, simple, good-vs.-evil terms – playing on their field, as it were, and into their hands? (For my money, though, the "honesty" factor is more important than which side is more compelling.)
  • "the moral domain varies across cultures" – to which my gut reaction is "Well DUHHH", followed by the similarly-obvious thought that this is exactly why morality (i.e. any single subculture's idea of what is good or bad) cannot be used as a basis for national policy in a multicultural society. Duhhh.
    • Haidt adds that the definition of "morality as being about justice, rights, and human welfare worked perfectly for the college students": the fact that the better-educated segment of Haidt's sample would think this seems like another rather blinding clue as to where the truth lies. Given exposure to only one set of values, those values become internalized in ways that aren't really analyzable; given exposure to multiple cultures and multiple sets of values, one realizes that the underlying commonality is exactly that: preventing harm to society and its individual members.
    • Haidt's final conclusion from this is that "morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way." First of all, he misrepresents the liberal position, or at least my understanding of it, which is that morality is (as I just said) about preventing harm to society and its members. Binding groups together and supporting essential institutions are both part of that goal. Haidt seems to be tying to slip those goals in as being something that is beyond rational analysis and incompatible with the value of "preventing harm", but they absolutely are not.
    • Where we might differ is that I would say "if an institution can't be shown to be valuable to society in some way, then who cares if it crumbles?" and Haidt might claim that it should be preserved anyway. If he were to say this, however, I think the burden of proof would be on him.
    • I would also add that the conservatives, when in power in Congress, showed absolutely no compunction about dismantling many institutions whose value was easily demonstrable. Nobody who is a Reagan/Gingrich/Bush republican has any business complaining about their institutions being threatened by liberals. If you go using your worthless-to-me institutions and customs as justification for stupid shit, then your institutions and customs have lost my sympathy.


More Haidt:

Conservative positions on gays, guns, god, and immigration must be understood as means to achieve one kind of morally ordered society.

They might work for a completely monolithic society, but that would be unacceptable (and downright un-American, to put it in emotional terms). If you want to do your little experiments in medieval social thinking, that's fine -- liberal tolerance allows for different ways, and perhaps we can learn from your experience. Just keep them out of my face, okay?

When Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop psychology they err, they alienate, and they earn the label "elitist."

  • they err: he doesn't show how, unless he's referring to his misrepresentations of liberalism's view of morality. Liberalism is the ideology which supports his contention that different cultures should be allowed to have their little ways; conservatism is far more the enemy of that idea.
  • elitist: Anyone frequenting this blog should know that we wear that label proudly. If "elitism" is rule by an elite, and "elite" is "a group of persons who by virtue of position or education exercise much power or influence", I don't see anything so terrible about that -- as long as the "elite" rise to the top as part of a meritocracy rather than by some sort of class or in-group system.

Now, remind me: which ideology is it that favors, according to Haidt, in-group loyalty? Which ideology is it whose philosophical father argued that the "unwashed masses" can't be trusted to rule wisely and that rule can only be trusted to a secret elite, and whose leaders and pundits describe democracy using phrases like "mob rule" and "tyranny of the majority"?

But how can Democrats learn to see – let alone respect – a moral order they regard as narrow-minded, racist, and dumb?

Moreover, why should they do so? Let's see if Haidt addresses that as we continue.

Haidt in India

Haidt then describes in some detail his visit to India, the take-away from which seems to be "OMG, people with rigid customs and other ideas I was brought up to despise can be nice people!" He also got used to the idea that lower-caste people didn't necessarily want to be emancipated – or even spoken to politely, if that wasn't part of the rules.

This is all very well, but then Haidt tries to bring this back home and apply it to America, where again he overlooks some crucial nuances:

[Conservatives] want more prayer and spanking in schools, and less sex education and access to abortion? I didn't think those steps would reduce AIDS and teen pregnancy, but I could see why the religious right wanted to "thicken up" the moral climate of schools and discourage the view that children should be as free as possible to act on their desires. Conservatives think that welfare programs and feminism increase rates of single motherhood and weaken the traditional social structures that compel men to support their own children? Hmm, that may be true, even if there are also many good effects of liberating women from dependence on men.

Some points:

  • Did Haidt stop to wonder whether the lower-caste Indians who served him were content in their role, or merely fearful of reprisal if they stepped out of it?
  • Assuming they are content, how does this apply to his American examples -- where women want to be liberated and in control of their reproductive organs, where most people want the option of choosing (or being free from) religion, and where children want to be treated decently?
  • Part of the authoritarian bargain which American authoritarians seem to forget whenever it suits them is this: in exchange for unquestioning obedience and support of his followers, the authoritarian leader must guarantee the safety and well-being of those followers in a manner that is clearly superior to what they could expect from society at large. If Indian servants are truly happy to continue as servants (rather than fearful of the consequences of trying to break away from that system), it can only be because the Indian authoritarians honor their part of the bargain. As long as American conservative authoritarians break end of the deal, the supposed desirability of the Indian class system cannot in any way be used to justify American conservatism.
  • Claiming "the view that children should be as free as possible to act on their desires" as a liberal preference is a bit of a mischaracterization; it is true at face value, but the word "possible" is open to being misinterpreted as "they want" rather than "is good for them and/or society".


Haidt continues:

I had escaped from my prior partisan mindset (reject first, ask rhetorical questions later), and began to think about liberal and conservative policies as manifestations of deeply conflicting but equally heartfelt visions of the good society.

If that was Haidt's view before India, it was not a liberal one. His post-India view is one that might work for a monocultural society like India (or an isolated conservative enclave) -- assuming the servant class finds it worthwhile -- but America is multicultural; the values shared by those cultures are generally those embraced by liberalism because they are shared, and the values that liberalism rejects (and that contemporary conservatism glories in) are those which demand that one culture must dominate the others -- as is generally the case in the India that Haidt describes.

On Turiel's definition of morality ("justice, rights, and welfare"), Christian and Hindu communities don't look good. They restrict people's rights (especially sexual rights), encourage hierarchy and conformity to gender roles, and make people spend extraordinary amounts of time in prayer and ritual practices that seem to have nothing to do with "real" morality.

Now hold on a minute here (again!). Just because people in those communities don't have rights we're familiar with doesn't mean they don't have rights -- perhaps even rights of equal or greater strength to those we have in the West. Complex caste systems typically have equally complex codes of grievance and redress. This has to do with the "authoritarian bargain" I mentioned earlier.

Just because our slave-owners gave their slaves no rights and treated them like cattle doesn't mean that servitude in India is equally demeaning. Remember, the Indian tradition has survived not decades but many centuries -- possibly millennia, for some elements. It is this attribute of having survived the test of time that makes a tradition valuable. Most of the "traditions" claimed by conservatives are recent innovations -- decades old at most -- which they have dusted off, re-branded as "eternal verities", and tried to shoehorn into a changing, modern society which increasingly rejects them.

For a counterexample which proves my point, look at the Amish. They've lived here since before America was a country. They have very strict social rules and an aversion to much of modern society -- but they keep to themselves, they don't try to change the greater society which hosts them (despite many philosophical differences), they take care of their own, they don't threaten anyone (important!) -- and you'd be very hard-pressed to find a liberal or progressive voice complaining about them, arguing that they need to "catch up" or "get with the times".

If conservatives want to go off and create enclaves where they can enforce their own rules (within reason and within the law and in a non-threatening way), they are certainly welcome to do that. If (on the other hand) they want to remake larger society in their own image, then their ideas and actions are (indeed, must be) fair game for the tools of rational analysis and criticism.

But isn't it unfair to impose on all cultures a definition of morality drawn from the European Enlightenment tradition? Might we do better with an approach that defines moral systems by what they do rather than by what they value?

That is compatible with what I just said, yes.

Haidt continues on a direction with which I can't really argue, defining morality as "any system of interlocking values, practices, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible." You can't build upon this a national political philosophy which deals well with diversity, but it seems reasonable as far as it goes.

And now we get to the bit which Barone quoted at length.

Haidt on ethos

Haidt sets up two distinct kinds of societal ethos:

  • A Millian society is "a social contract invented for our mutual benefit. All individuals are equal, and all should be left as free as possible to move, develop talents, and form relationships as they please."
  • A Durkheimian society is "not ... an agreement among individuals but ... something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy."

Editing is currently in progress on this article, and the author or editor has saved their work to prevent loss. Please check back later by reloading the page, and do not edit while this message is still showing. Thank you.

Retrieved from "https://issuepedia.org/mw/index.php?title=2008-09-09_What_Makes_People_Vote_Republican/woozle&oldid=16470"