Difference between revisions of "David Brin: Reducing Blame to Fundamentals"
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#:(Noteworthy and significant: those demanding his ouster in '03 were the same parties who deliberately left him in power, in '91.) | #:(Noteworthy and significant: those demanding his ouster in '03 were the same parties who deliberately left him in power, in '91.) | ||
| − | + | [[US military readiness|readiness]] languished to levels much lower than pre-9/11, and possibly pre-Pearl Harbor. At present, our active and reserve military strength is stretched thin while emergency stockpiles have gone the way of the Budget Surplus. Some - even before Katrina - legitimately questioned our ability to respond to a new shock of any kind. These questions now seem especially cogent. | |
# One might have expected FEMA to be enhanced after 9/11, with critical attention paid to ''general flexibility'' - our ability to respond well to any national emergency, including - but not limited to - terrorism. Before Iraq, drills involving federal state and local agencies had uncovered countless command flaws of the very kind that we saw emerge, tragically, during Katrina. But contrary to assurances made at the highest levels, this process of drills and contingency planning ''ebbed'' after 9/11, with budgets transferred to Iraq. | # One might have expected FEMA to be enhanced after 9/11, with critical attention paid to ''general flexibility'' - our ability to respond well to any national emergency, including - but not limited to - terrorism. Before Iraq, drills involving federal state and local agencies had uncovered countless command flaws of the very kind that we saw emerge, tragically, during Katrina. But contrary to assurances made at the highest levels, this process of drills and contingency planning ''ebbed'' after 9/11, with budgets transferred to Iraq. | ||