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| The question is '''How do we prevent The Revolution from being co-opted (again)?''' Movements and organizations typically start out with the best of motives and principles, but soon begin to compromise those principles as they become more powerful and more able to actually carry out their plans. | | The question is '''How do we prevent The Revolution from being co-opted (again)?''' Movements and organizations typically start out with the best of motives and principles, but soon begin to compromise those principles as they become more powerful and more able to actually carry out their plans. |
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− | It may be argued that this is just the nature of things -- but I think we can use the tools we now have available to improve on this.
| + | One key to the solution is that the problem happens when too much power is in the hands of too few. We need to make sure that power is distributed in ways that ''inhibit improper use'' without ''preventing necessary use''. |
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− | One short answer is that the problem happens when too much power is in the hands of too few. A good solution is to make sure that power is distributed in ways that inhibit improper use without preventing necessary use.
| + | Another key is that we need to use a variety of safety mechanisms and backups. The Constitution does this, but it didn't anticipate automation and modern media -- which is partly responsible for the failures of those safety checks, but also offers us the tools to build better ones. |
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− | Another short answer is that we need to use a variety of safety mechanisms and backups. The Constitution does this, but it didn't anticipate automation and modern media -- which is partly responsible for the failures of those safety checks, but also offers us the tools to build better ones.
| + | A third key is that the system needs to provide an easy way for citizens to ditch parts of it that become corrupt, without cutting themselves off from vital services. A monopoly on many vital services is one way the current system sustains itself. |
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− | The third short answer is that the system needs to provide an easy way for citizens to ditch parts of it that become corrupt, without sacrificing the benefits we get from the system.
| + | When I first wrote this section, I dove straight in and suggested a design for a new form of government -- but I'm thinking I need to unbundle that suggestion to see if there is agreement (or not) on each of the parts. |
− | ==A Proposal==
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− | This is intended as a discussion-starting proposal. There will be significant problems with it, but it gets us out of the box of asking "who can we elect?" or "what law can we change?", when what we really need is a better system.
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− | Instead of tying political representation to geography, let's allow people to ''choose'' which representation group to join. As with Obamacare, everyone would have to join ''some'' group, and pay dues (presumably income-based) to that group. If we don't like the customer service, we can join another one -- or ''start'' another one.
| + | There are actually three ideas here: |
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− | What I just described is the target political environment, when the new system has largely or completely supplanted the current one -- but it doesn't have to do so monolithically. We don't have to bring this before Congress or get everyone in the country to agree to switch (both of which would be essentially impossible). Instead, the new can ''compete'' with the old, and spread "virally" until it dominates. Here's how I see that happening.
| + | # political change within the system is insufficient; we need new organizations outside the government |
| + | # those new organizations should ultimately aim to push the buttons of the old system like a modern computer program talking to a mainframe text interface |
| + | # if you grant the first two, then we need one or more design proposals for a new, less-corruptible government ([[../microgov|here's mine]]) |
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− | The first step is to create Grassroots Org 2.0 (or is that 3.0?): a type of organization which thinks as much in terms of 'governance'' as in terms of effecting needed change. I'll call these entities "microgovernments".
| + | Whether or not we decide to replace the existing system, I would like to recommend the following institutions (government and social) for removal or revision: |
− | ===Microgovernments===
| + | * the [[US Electoral College|Electoral College]] |
− | Unlike a grassroots org, a microgovernment ("microgov", "µgov", or "µg" for short):
| + | * the [[US Federal Reserve|Federal Reserve]] |
− | * need not have a predetermined cause -- ideally, it should fight only for the causes decided upon by its members | + | * one-vote-per-person-binary voting |
− | * has a way of aggregating the opinions of its members so as to arrive at a consensus agreeable to all | + | * democracy needs to be less "representative" and more direct (which is always presented as this Really Bad Idea; I think that's a hoax) |
− | * provides infrastructural (government-like) services to its members, where appropriate (possible services: tax preparation, unemployment safety net, health insurance, emergency housing) | + | * the job-centered economy (you shouldn't have to have a "real job" to survive at an adequate level) |
− | * is designed from the ground up to be "clonable" -- members can start their own offshoots if they don't like the way things are going, and they would have the right to contact the current membership with a "split proposal". We want µgovs to be constantly worried about keeping their members happy so this won't happen. | |
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− | Like a grassroots org, a microgovernment:
| + | Which parts of this are we in agreement on, and which parts need to be discussed further? Are there any other suggestions for (government or social) institutions which should be at least reconsidered? |
− | * provides negotiating and publicity services on behalf of causes decided upon by its members
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− | ** in the present political environment, "negotiating services" would include advertising campaigns and lobbying
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− | * has no legal hold on its members (citizens can switch at will)
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− | Potential problems:
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− | * rich people forming their own reduced-tax µgovs
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− | ** in the ''target'' political environment this isn't much of a problem, because influence is allocated per person -- 100 billionaires would have no more vote than 100 other people
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− | ** in the current political environment -- well, the billionaires and corporations have already formed their lobbying groups; we're just forming our own to fight back.
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− | * microgovs expelling "less productive" individuals, leading to the same problem we have now (homelessness, poverty, no social net)
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− | ** Maybe we need some ground rules for dealing with this -- a pact between µgovs. Again, representation of each µgov's position ''must'' be allocated by population; this will give µgovs some incentive to take on more people even if they aren't obviously "economically beneficial" to the µgov to which they belong.
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− | ** Another good ground rule might be that µgovs ''cannot expel citizens'' -- at least without due process based on rules agreed to by all µgovs -- Constitution 2.0? -- and possibly not for any reason. (Need to think of some scenarios for this, including both unjustified and possibly-justified expulsion.)
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− | So, why would anyone join one of these things, if they're not do-gooders with too much money?
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− | ===Competition: Microgovs vs. Grassroots Orgs===
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− | {{draft}}
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− | ===Competition: Microgovs vs. Charities===
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− | First, for the same reason people give to charity -- except that charities are notoriously opaque{{footnote/link|1}}. We can do better, by using web accounting software to let members examine a µgov's books in detail, and forums to engage in discussion about items of interest found there.
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− | Second, because charities aren't taking care of the things that need taking care of{{footnote/link|2}}. We can do better; this is not rocket science.
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− | Third, because charities tend to be one-trick ponies, which means we get solicitations from dozens of different agencies at different times, and there's no easy way to come up with a sane strategy for deciding how much money to contribute and how to allocate it amongst them.
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− | ===Competition: Microgovs vs. Traditional Government===
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− | {{draft}}
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− | ==Footnotes==
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− | <small>
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− | * {{footnote/target|1|You give your money, but where are the progress reports? How much money did The Salvation Army take in last year? What did they spend it on? What did they accomplish (in numbers)? Who made the braindead decision to [http://www.edmontonsun.com/news/canada/2010/12/08/16478011.html throw away donations of Harry Potter books]? What have they [http://gay.americablog.com/2009/12/salvation-army-is-nasty-anti-gay.html got against hiring gay people]?}}
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− | * {{footnote/target|2|Why are there still homeless people begging for money on the corners, with hand-written cardboard signs? (Why aren't there safe places for these people to live and adequate food for them to eat while they look for work? Why don't the charities provide online profiles of the people they help who are looking for work, in case someone would like to hire them?)}}
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− | </small>
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The question is How do we prevent The Revolution from being co-opted (again)? Movements and organizations typically start out with the best of motives and principles, but soon begin to compromise those principles as they become more powerful and more able to actually carry out their plans.
One key to the solution is that the problem happens when too much power is in the hands of too few. We need to make sure that power is distributed in ways that inhibit improper use without preventing necessary use.
Another key is that we need to use a variety of safety mechanisms and backups. The Constitution does this, but it didn't anticipate automation and modern media -- which is partly responsible for the failures of those safety checks, but also offers us the tools to build better ones.
A third key is that the system needs to provide an easy way for citizens to ditch parts of it that become corrupt, without cutting themselves off from vital services. A monopoly on many vital services is one way the current system sustains itself.
When I first wrote this section, I dove straight in and suggested a design for a new form of government -- but I'm thinking I need to unbundle that suggestion to see if there is agreement (or not) on each of the parts.
There are actually three ideas here:
- political change within the system is insufficient; we need new organizations outside the government
- those new organizations should ultimately aim to push the buttons of the old system like a modern computer program talking to a mainframe text interface
- if you grant the first two, then we need one or more design proposals for a new, less-corruptible government (here's mine)
Whether or not we decide to replace the existing system, I would like to recommend the following institutions (government and social) for removal or revision:
- the Electoral College
- the Federal Reserve
- one-vote-per-person-binary voting
- democracy needs to be less "representative" and more direct (which is always presented as this Really Bad Idea; I think that's a hoax)
- the job-centered economy (you shouldn't have to have a "real job" to survive at an adequate level)
Which parts of this are we in agreement on, and which parts need to be discussed further? Are there any other suggestions for (government or social) institutions which should be at least reconsidered?