Difference between revisions of "User:Woozle/Free Will"
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For convenience, I'll use the following shorthand to refer to specific meanings of "free will": | For convenience, I'll use the following shorthand to refer to specific meanings of "free will": | ||
* '''FW!aca''' = academic usage (yet to be defined) | * '''FW!aca''' = academic usage (yet to be defined) | ||
| − | * '''FW!lay''' = lay usage (how most people understand it -- real-world consequences for ethical and legal systems | + | * '''FW!lay''' = lay usage (how most people understand it -- real-world consequences for ethical and legal systems) |
* '''FW!SH''' = Harris's usage, as derived from statements in this book | * '''FW!SH''' = Harris's usage, as derived from statements in this book | ||
| + | * '''FW!W''' = my definition, as spelled out [[free will|here]] -- an attempt at defining FW!lay | ||
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Tentatively, there are two main usages of the term: '''academic''' and '''lay'''. It has been argued that Harris is discussing only the ''academic'' usage of the term, but Harris's very first paragraph leaves me thinking that he's actually referring to the ''lay'' understanding of it (emphasis mine): | Tentatively, there are two main usages of the term: '''academic''' and '''lay'''. It has been argued that Harris is discussing only the ''academic'' usage of the term, but Harris's very first paragraph leaves me thinking that he's actually referring to the ''lay'' understanding of it (emphasis mine): | ||
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</blockquote> | </blockquote> | ||
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| + | Harris concludes with another statement that gives us some insight into FW!SH: | ||
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| + | Gosh, you mean that the concepts of "free will", "volition", and "consciousness" might involve complex feedback loops and recursive interactions, instead of being a simple unidirectional set of instructions with a completely predictable outcome? Who knew that sentience would be so difficult to understand. </sarcasm> | ||
How is that "storm" not the very ''essence'' of free will? | How is that "storm" not the very ''essence'' of free will? | ||
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==Chapter 2: Changing the Subject (p.21)== | ==Chapter 2: Changing the Subject (p.21)== | ||
| − | In this chapter, Harris seems to be switching from | + | In this chapter, Harris seems to be switching from the colloquial definition of free will (FW!lay) which seems to be the subject of the introduction and Chapter 1 to more academic discussions of the concept (FW!aca). It's not clear whether he considers both FW!aca and FW!lay to be encompassed by FW!SH, or whether they are even consistent with each other. It ''almost'' seems as if he is dismissing FW!lay as unworkable, and turning next to FW!aca to see if it contains anything more usable -- but he does not actually say this as far as I can see. |
He states that the philosophical literature contains three principal approaches to the idea of free will: | He states that the philosophical literature contains three principal approaches to the idea of free will: | ||
* [[determinism]] | * [[determinism]] | ||
| − | * [[libertarianism]] | + | * [[philosophical libertarianism|libertarianism]] (see {{wikipedia|Libertarianism (metaphysics)}}) |
* [[compatibilism]] | * [[compatibilism]] | ||
| − | + | Harris states that determinism and libertarianism both hold (basically) that free will cannot exist if our actions are determined by previous experience. This is not strictly true, for several reasons: | |
| + | |||
| + | * '''Determinism''': | ||
| + | ** It is only ''hard'' determinism which holds this. | ||
| + | ** Even within a completely deterministic process (i.e. no quantum effects), it can be practically impossible to predict the outcome of a given operation because you cannot precisely replicate the initial conditions upon which the operation depends. | ||
| + | ** Even within a completely deterministic process, it can be theoretically impossible to predict the outcome of a given operation without duplicating that operation exactly. | ||
| + | ** In other words, for some types of processes, '''there is no shortcut'''; you must become the other person, and travel back to the exact time and place, knowing only what they know, in order to accurately predict what they would do under those conditions. You cannot simplify or model; you must visit the territory, because no map carries sufficient information. While this does not negate the idea of determinism itself, it does negate most of the things we might assume to be true in a deterministic universe; it does not make the universe any more predictable or regular. | ||
| + | * '''Libertarianism''' argues that free will is logically incompatible with a deterministic universe and that agents have free will, and that, therefore, determinism is false. | ||
| + | ** See above for why this is wrong. | ||
| + | |||
| + | (Harris argues that the data shows pretty conclusively that yes, our actions are in every meaningful sense determined by prior experience in the real world -- and I agree.) | ||
| − | " | + | Having (perhaps prematurely) eliminated determinism and libertarianism, Harris next looks at "compatibilism", which basically just represents the only remaining possibility -- that {the determination of action by previous experience} is compatible with the idea of free will -- along with a body of thought arguing for this view. |
<blockquote title="page 24">Compatibilists generally claim that a person is free as long as he is free from any outer or inner compulsions that would prevent him from acting on his actual desires and intentions.</blockquote> | <blockquote title="page 24">Compatibilists generally claim that a person is free as long as he is free from any outer or inner compulsions that would prevent him from acting on his actual desires and intentions.</blockquote> | ||
| − | This is compatible with [[free will| | + | This is compatible with [[free will|FW!W]] ''except'' for the phrase "or inner" -- not because I disagree, but because I think we're moving into nebulous territory by validating the idea of "inner compulsions" -- and that kind of ambiguity has a way of becoming a conflation of different concepts. We need to pin down what we're talking about before we start using it to conclude things. |
So, where do we draw the line between "outer, "inner", and "self"? | So, where do we draw the line between "outer, "inner", and "self"? | ||
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| − | This speaks clearly of something within the brain but ''external to the self''. | + | This speaks clearly of something within the brain but ''external to the self''. He did not ''decide'' (or even ''believe'' he had decided, however wrong it might be to believe in one's own agency in decisionmaking) to take this action; some ''"thing"'' got triggered, and apparently took over. |
| − | I have also read of a schizophrenic who | + | I have also read of a schizophrenic who somehow figured out that he frequently mis-heard calm remarks as violent obscenities, and had learned to double-check whenever a remark seemed out of character. Others less intelligent, less observant, or more prone to violence might not have been able to overcome this [[information processing defect]], and might therefore have committed lethal acts as a result of their misunderstanding of a situation (e.g. falsely believing that their life was in jeopardy because of mis-processing an innocuous comment). To the extent that they were choosing their reactions to a given situation (i.e. the belief of a mortal threat), someone with this problem would be exercising free will -- but to the extent that their understanding of the situation was being distorted by means beyond their control (causing them to react inappropriately to the ''real'' situation), they were ''not'' exercising free will. (Note: I had to add to [[free will|my definition]] the condition that one's perception of reality [[Free will/accuracy of perception|must not be distorted]] beyond any reasonable expectation.) |
| − | For that reason -- i.e. that the boundaries of the brain do not define the boundaries of the "self" -- I prefer to speak of "external" compulsions (meaning something arising outside the self, outside one's control) rather than "outer" or "inner". K's bludgeoning of Petit was the result of something "triggered ... within him", but neither a deliberate choice nor something which he saw (in retrospect) as ''being in accordance with his conscious wishes'' (either at the time or later). | + | For that reason -- i.e. that the boundaries of the brain do not define the boundaries of the "self" -- I prefer to speak of "external" compulsions (meaning something arising outside the self, outside one's control) rather than "outer" or "inner". (Not because the language is better, but just so I can claim the words "internal" and "external" and use them as I wish for the purpose of this discussion.) K's bludgeoning of Petit was the result of something "triggered ... within him", but neither a deliberate choice nor something which he saw (in retrospect) as ''being in accordance with his conscious wishes'' (either at the time or later). |
| − | Note that it's possible that K did have some ''subconscious'' wishes that were played out that night, and that the existence of such ''would'' in fact be a constraint on his free will -- but that still doesn't mean that free will doesn't exist; it just means that free will can be subject to constraints arising inside the brain. | + | Note that it's possible that K did have some ''subconscious'' wishes that were played out that night, and that the existence of such ''would'' in fact be a constraint on his free will -- but that still doesn't mean that free will doesn't exist; it just means that free will can be subject to constraints arising inside the brain (but nonetheless external to the self -- I'd say a "constraint" is external ''by definition''). |
==Post-processing: definition of FW!SH== | ==Post-processing: definition of FW!SH== | ||