Difference between revisions of "User:Woozle/Free Will"
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[[subject::''Free Will'']] | [[subject::''Free Will'']] | ||
</hide> | </hide> | ||
| − | ==Introduction== | + | ==Introduction (p.14)== |
Harris starts out using the phrase "[[free will]]" as if the definition were uncontested and unilateral. From various discussions of this book online, however, there seems to be substantial ambiguity surrounding the term, and much of the disagreement with Harris's thesis arises from [[conflation]] of the possible definitions. | Harris starts out using the phrase "[[free will]]" as if the definition were uncontested and unilateral. From various discussions of this book online, however, there seems to be substantial ambiguity surrounding the term, and much of the disagreement with Harris's thesis arises from [[conflation]] of the possible definitions. | ||
| − | + | {| align=right style="border: 1px solid blue; margin: 1em;" | |
| + | |- | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | For convenience, I'll use the following shorthand to refer to specific meanings of "free will": | ||
| + | * '''FW!aca''' = academic usage (yet to be defined) | ||
| + | * '''FW!lay''' = lay usage (how most people understand it -- real-world consequences for ethical and legal systems; see [[free will]]) | ||
| + | * '''FW!SH''' = Harris's usage, as derived from statements in this book | ||
| + | |} | ||
Tentatively, there are two main usages of the term: '''academic''' and '''lay'''. It has been argued that Harris is discussing only the ''academic'' usage of the term, but Harris's very first paragraph leaves me thinking that he's actually referring to the ''lay'' understanding of it (emphasis mine): | Tentatively, there are two main usages of the term: '''academic''' and '''lay'''. It has been argued that Harris is discussing only the ''academic'' usage of the term, but Harris's very first paragraph leaves me thinking that he's actually referring to the ''lay'' understanding of it (emphasis mine): | ||
| − | <blockquote><p>...most of what is distinctly human about our lives seems to depend upon '''our viewing one another''' as autonomous persons, capable of free choice.</p></blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 1"><p>...most of what is distinctly human about our lives seems to depend upon '''our viewing one another''' as autonomous persons, capable of free choice.</p></blockquote> |
Just a few sentences later, he makes it clear that he is referring to a real-world understanding with direct consequences for our legal and ethical systems: | Just a few sentences later, he makes it clear that he is referring to a real-world understanding with direct consequences for our legal and ethical systems: | ||
| − | <blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 1"> |
</blockquote> | </blockquote> | ||
From this, we can derive one fact about "free will" in the sense that Harris means it: its absence means that cognition is not just deterministic, but "clockwork". | From this, we can derive one fact about "free will" in the sense that Harris means it: its absence means that cognition is not just deterministic, but "clockwork". | ||
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===Hayes and Komisarjevsky=== | ===Hayes and Komisarjevsky=== | ||
I see at least a couple of logical flaws in the discussion of the two murderers. My position on this matter is not one that is (yet) part of the cultural mainstream, but I believe it follows rationally (and compassionately) from what we now know about crime. | I see at least a couple of logical flaws in the discussion of the two murderers. My position on this matter is not one that is (yet) part of the cultural mainstream, but I believe it follows rationally (and compassionately) from what we now know about crime. | ||
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"Such details might begin to give us pause.", says Harris, but then adds: | "Such details might begin to give us pause.", says Harris, but then adds: | ||
| − | <blockquote>Whatever their conscious motives, these men cannot know why they are as they are. Nor can we account for why we are not like them.</blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 7">Whatever their conscious motives, these men cannot know why they are as they are. Nor can we account for why we are not like them.</blockquote> |
This is a naked assertion, without any evidence; since we're still in the introduction, presumably Harris will defend it later... but on the face of it, it seems clearly wrong: Certainly through studying the brain -- as Harris himself describes in his book ''[[The Moral Landscape]]'', if I understand that book's thesis correctly -- we can gain an understanding of what particular features lead to various types of criminal behavior. We have already begun to do this, and progress in brain science is accelerating rapidly. Saying "we can't account" for their behavior is absurd. | This is a naked assertion, without any evidence; since we're still in the introduction, presumably Harris will defend it later... but on the face of it, it seems clearly wrong: Certainly through studying the brain -- as Harris himself describes in his book ''[[The Moral Landscape]]'', if I understand that book's thesis correctly -- we can gain an understanding of what particular features lead to various types of criminal behavior. We have already begun to do this, and progress in brain science is accelerating rapidly. Saying "we can't account" for their behavior is absurd. | ||
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Harris then makes a circular argument: | Harris then makes a circular argument: | ||
| − | <blockquote>I have to admit that if I were to trade places with one of these men, atom for atom, I would be him: There is no extra part of me that could decide to see the world differently or to resist the impulse to victimize other people.</blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 7">I have to admit that if I were to trade places with one of these men, atom for atom, I would ''be'' him: There is no extra part of me that could decide to see the world differently or to resist the impulse to victimize other people.</blockquote> |
Sure -- if you were that other person exactly, then there wouldn't be any part of you that was different from them. How is this a meaningful statement? | Sure -- if you were that other person exactly, then there wouldn't be any part of you that was different from them. How is this a meaningful statement? | ||
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* conscious control is required for "free will" | * conscious control is required for "free will" | ||
| − | <blockquote>Free will is actually more than an illusion (or less), in that it cannot be made conceptually coherent. Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them.</blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 10">Free will is actually more than an illusion (or less), in that it cannot be made conceptually coherent. Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them.</blockquote> |
Finally we start to get to the argument behind Harris's thesis. This is an obvious [[false dichotomy]]. Why can't our wills be the end product of ''both'' prior causes and chance? Less trivially, even if our wills were entirely the product of prior causes, how does this contradict the idea that we have free will? He's right that <abbr title="Sam Harris's definition of free will">FW!SH</abbr> is conceptually incoherent, but that does not mean it cannot be defined in a coherent way; he has simply failed to do so. | Finally we start to get to the argument behind Harris's thesis. This is an obvious [[false dichotomy]]. Why can't our wills be the end product of ''both'' prior causes and chance? Less trivially, even if our wills were entirely the product of prior causes, how does this contradict the idea that we have free will? He's right that <abbr title="Sam Harris's definition of free will">FW!SH</abbr> is conceptually incoherent, but that does not mean it cannot be defined in a coherent way; he has simply failed to do so. | ||
| − | <blockquote>The popular conception of free will seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present. As we are about to see, however, both of these assumptions are false.</blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 11">The popular conception of free will seems to rest on two assumptions: (1) that each of us could have behaved differently than we did in the past, and (2) that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present. As we are about to see, however, both of these assumptions are false.</blockquote> |
I'll be interested to see his arguments for both of these. | I'll be interested to see his arguments for both of these. | ||
| − | <blockquote>Seeming acts of volition merely arise spontaneously (whether caused, uncaused, or probabilistically inclined, it makes no difference) and cannot be traced to a point of origin in our conscious minds. A moment or two of serious self-scrutiny, and you might observe that you no more decide the next thought you think than the next thought I write.</blockquote> | + | <blockquote title="page 14, paragraph 12">Seeming acts of volition merely arise spontaneously (whether caused, uncaused, or probabilistically inclined, it makes no difference) and cannot be traced to a point of origin in our conscious minds. A moment or two of serious self-scrutiny, and you might observe that you no more decide the next thought you think than the next thought I write.</blockquote> |
How does this contradict the idea of free will? (Or, in other words, "so what?") | How does this contradict the idea of free will? (Or, in other words, "so what?") | ||
| − | ==Chapter 1: The Unconscious Origins of the Will== | + | ==Chapter 1: The Unconscious Origins of the Will (p.18)== |
The argument here seems to be that because we cannot explain the processes by which we arrive at decisions or initiate actions, we therefore do not control our own decisions or actions. | The argument here seems to be that because we cannot explain the processes by which we arrive at decisions or initiate actions, we therefore do not control our own decisions or actions. | ||
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So what if brain scans can detect your decisions before you make them? How does that mean you didn't make them? When I order a pizza, the cooks at the pizza oven know before I do when the pizza is ready -- and how it came out. Does this mean that I didn't order it after all, that I was somehow predestined to order it, that it somehow could have been predicted in advance? | So what if brain scans can detect your decisions before you make them? How does that mean you didn't make them? When I order a pizza, the cooks at the pizza oven know before I do when the pizza is ready -- and how it came out. Does this mean that I didn't order it after all, that I was somehow predestined to order it, that it somehow could have been predicted in advance? | ||
| − | + | Consider the difference between the ''decision to make a decision'' (e.g. "I'm hungry. What are my options?") with the decision itself ("There's a snack machine. I have cash in my pocket. Am I hungry enough to go through the effort of getting up, going over there, and punching some buttons in order to get a tiny bag of potato chips?"). The scanner can detect that we've decided to get up before we even know we've decided it -- but does it know that before we've realized that we're hungry? Maybe it can even detect that we've realized that we're hungry -- but does it know that before we start thinking about it? Does it know when we're about to start thinking about it? | |
How does any of this apparent foreknowledge (by a few seconds) support Harris's contention that we have no control over our own decisions and actions? | How does any of this apparent foreknowledge (by a few seconds) support Harris's contention that we have no control over our own decisions and actions? | ||
| − | + | <blockquote | |
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| + | Again, I refer to riding a bicycle: you may not know in advance which direction your muscles will twitch as they operate to keep you in balance, but that says nothing at all against your ability to decide whether to take a right or left fork, much less your ability to set a destination as your goal and to arrive there. | ||
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| + | <blockquote title="page 21, penultimate paragraph">Of course, this insight [that free will is an illusion] does not make social and political freedom any less important.</blockquote> | ||
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| + | I'm glad Harris says this -- but I worry that it will be overlooked. "If free will is an illusion," I can imagine the argument going, "why does it matter whether we allow people to rule themselves or not, since people will vote however they want to regardless of what is reasonable? Should we bother to attempt rehabilitation of criminals, since they are just acting on their brain-wiring regardless of what we teach them? Is reason really any better than blind [[faith]], if we are all just operating according to our pre-programmed instructions?" | ||
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| + | The fact that Harris's arguments against "free will" do not support any of these conclusions can easily be overlooked, since he '''still has not given a clear definition of what he is arguing against''' -- and especially given that he seems to be concluding (in his introduction) that these things ''would'' in fact be true in the absence of free will: | ||
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| + | <blockquote title="page 14 paragraph 1"> | ||
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| + | </blockquote> | ||
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| + | <blockquote title="page 21, final paragraph" | ||
How is that "storm" not the very ''essence'' of free will? | How is that "storm" not the very ''essence'' of free will? | ||
| − | ==Chapter 2: Changing the Subject== | + | |
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| + | ==Chapter 2: Changing the Subject (p.21)== | ||
| + | In this chapter, Harris seems to be switching from a more colloquial definition of free will (FW!lay) to academic discussions of the concept (FW!aca). It's not clear whether he considers both FW!aca and FW!lay to be encompassed by FW!SH, or whether they are even consistent with each other. | ||
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| + | He states that the philosophical literature contains three principal approaches to the idea of free will: | ||
| + | * [[determinism]] | ||
| + | * [[libertarianism]] | ||
| + | * [[compatibilism]] | ||
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| + | Since determinism and libertarianism both hold (basically) that free will cannot exist if our actions are determined by previous experience. (Harris argues that the data shows pretty conclusively that yes, our actions are in every meaningful sense determined by prior experience in the real world -- and I agree.) | ||
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| + | "Compatibilism", represents the opposing view -- that {the determination of action by previous experience} is compatible with the idea of free will -- along with a body of thought arguing for this view. | ||
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| + | <blockquote title="page 24">Compatibilists generally claim that a person is free as long as he is free from any outer or inner compulsions that would prevent him from acting on his actual desires and intentions.</blockquote> | ||
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| + | This is compatible with [[free will|my own definition]] ''except'' for the phrase "or inner" -- not because I disagree, but because I think we're moving into nebulous territory by validating the idea of "inner compulsions" -- and that kind of ambiguity has a way of becoming a conflation of different concepts. We need to pin down what we're talking about before we start using it to conclude things. | ||
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| + | So, where do we draw the line between "outer, "inner", and "self"? | ||
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| + | I think Harris would agree with me that an epileptic does not suffer seizures by choice, and that therefore those seizures do not represent an exercise of free will -- even though they originate from within the brain -- because they do not originate within the "self". | ||
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| + | Let's go straight to the other end of the spectrum and take another look at those two deranged killers Harris mentioned in the introduction: | ||
| + | * Hayes (H) has since shown signs of remorse and has attempted suicide | ||
| + | * Komisarjevsky (K) "claims to have been stunned by his own behavior in the Petit home: He was a career burglar, not a murderer, and he had not consciously intended to kill anyone." | ||
| + | |||
| + | Are these the reactions of men whose acts were made of their own free will? Certainly not -- Harris even uses them as evidence that ''none'' of us have free will. This is, however, an [[overgeneralization]] -- most of us do not commit apparently deliberate acts of horror that leave us stunned, remorseful and suicidal, wondering what got into us -- as K apparently found himself wondering (emphasis mine): | ||
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| + | This speaks clearly of something within the brain but ''external to the self''. | ||
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| + | I have also read of a schizophrenic who recognized that he frequently mis-heard calm remarks as violent obscenities, and had learned to double-check whenever a remark seemed out of character. Others less intelligent, less observant, or more prone to violence might not have been able to overcome this [[information processing defect]], and might therefore have committed lethal acts as a result of their misunderstanding of a situation (e.g. falsely believing that their life was in jeopardy because of mis-processing an innocuous comment). To the extent that they were choosing their reactions to a given situation (i.e. the belief of a mortal threat), someone with this problem would be exercising free will -- but to the extent that their understanding of the situation was being distorted by means beyond their control (causing them to react inappropriately to the ''real'' situation), they were ''not'' exercising free will. (Note: I had to add to [[free will|my definition]] the condition that one's perception of reality [[Free will/accuracy of perception|must not be distorted]] beyond any reasonable expectation.) | ||
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| + | For that reason -- i.e. that the boundaries of the brain do not define the boundaries of the "self" -- I prefer to speak of "external" compulsions (meaning something arising outside the self, outside one's control) rather than "outer" or "inner". K's bludgeoning of Petit was the result of something "triggered ... within him", but neither a deliberate choice nor something which he saw (in retrospect) as ''being in accordance with his conscious wishes'' (either at the time or later). | ||
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| + | Note that it's possible that K did have some ''subconscious'' wishes that were played out that night, and that the existence of such ''would'' in fact be a constraint on his free will -- but that still doesn't mean that free will doesn't exist; it just means that free will can be subject to constraints arising inside the brain. | ||
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| + | ==Post-processing: definition of FW!SH== | ||
| + | From all the clues Harris has left scattered through his book, here is what we know about FW!SH: | ||
| + | * "Most of what is distinctly human about our lives seems to depend upon our viewing one another as autonomous persons, capable of free choice." | ||
| + | ** Society bases its rules on the idea that people have free will. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ** Free will is required in order for people to be something other than clockwork. | ||
| + | ** Free will is required in order for punishment to be an effective deterrent. | ||
| + | ** Free will is required in order for individuals to deserve the fruits of their efforts in any meaningful way. | ||
| + | * "Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control." | ||
| + | ** Free will requires conscious awareness of our decisionmaking process. | ||
| + | * <cite title="page 21">"Consider what it would take to actually have free will. You would need to be aware of all the factors that determine your thoughts and actions, and you would need to have complete control over those factors."</cite> | ||
| + | ** Free will requires not just conscious awareness of our decisionmaking process, but conscious awareness of every detail of that process. | ||
{{draft}} | {{draft}} | ||