Difference between revisions of "2008-09-09 What Makes People Vote Republican/woozle"

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m (→‎Haidt: introduction: put quote in blockquote instead of italics; tidying and rewriting)
(→‎Haidt: morality: lots of rewriting; two new subsections (liberal morality, conservative morality))
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===Haidt: morality===
 
===Haidt: morality===
 
First, Haidt rejects the idea that morality is solely about "how we treat each other", citing as examples ancient "rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom". This makes some rather questionable assumptions:
 
First, Haidt rejects the idea that morality is solely about "how we treat each other", citing as examples ancient "rules about menstruation, who can eat what, and who can have sex with whom". This makes some rather questionable assumptions:
* That these laws were considered "morals" at the time, rather than just "laws" -- rules which people felt compelled to obey, rather than rules which most people agreed were right
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* That these laws were considered "morals" (rules which most people agreed were "right") at the time, rather than just "laws" (rules which people felt compelled to obey)
 
* That morality worked the same way in ancient times as it does now (I don't think so; many of those laws seem pretty bizarre and often downright immoral to me, so if they accurately represent the morality of the time, we must have matured a lot since then)
 
* That morality worked the same way in ancient times as it does now (I don't think so; many of those laws seem pretty bizarre and often downright immoral to me, so if they accurately represent the morality of the time, we must have matured a lot since then)
  
Haidt adds that "There is no rational or health-related way to explain these laws.". Okay, so what is the reason for them? Oh, wait, he said there ''is no rational way'' to explain them. So they were totally arbitrary. Got it. Moving on...
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Haidt adds that "There is no rational or health-related way to explain these laws." Okay, so what is the reason for them? Oh, wait, he said there ''is no rational way'' to explain them. So they were totally arbitrary. Got it. Moving on...
  
Haidt then advances the hypothesis that these laws were drawn up on the basis of what an ancient cleric might have found to be "disgusting". (Hmm, I thought he said there was no rational way to explain them. Surely if you're a powerful priest, and something disgusts you, you would quite reasonably want to outlaw it, being ancient and everything, and not really knowing any better or having any reason to question one's ideas, since liberalism hadn't been invented yet. So is Haidt excluding emotion as a possible motivator for rational action, here?)
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Haidt then advances the hypothesis that these laws were drawn up on the basis of what an ancient cleric might have found to be "disgusting". (Hmm, I thought he said there was [[skepticism bypass|no rational way]] to explain them. Surely if you're a powerful priest, and something disgusts you, you would quite reasonably want to outlaw it – being ancient and everything, and not really knowing any better or having any reason to question one's ideas since liberalism hadn't been invented yet. So is Haidt excluding emotion as a possible motivator for rational action, here? (...and surely outlawing actions based on whether a bunch of ancient priests found them "disgusting" is a pretty awful way to decide "right" and "wrong", regardless of your goals.))
  
 
Haidt then tested this hypothesis for his dissertation, where he "made up stories about people who did things that were disgusting or disrespectful yet perfectly harmless." What he found was that most people agreed that the actions were wrong even though nobody was harmed -- which, he argues, supports his hypothesis that morality is not (or not entirely) based on avoidance of harm to others.
 
Haidt then tested this hypothesis for his dissertation, where he "made up stories about people who did things that were disgusting or disrespectful yet perfectly harmless." What he found was that most people agreed that the actions were wrong even though nobody was harmed -- which, he argues, supports his hypothesis that morality is not (or not entirely) based on avoidance of harm to others.
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* '''"a family whose dog is killed by a car, so they dismember the body and cook it for dinner"''': There are all kinds of flaws with this as an example supporting Haidt's point. First of all, some cultures ''do'' eat dog meat (what was that about liberals believing "that we have nothing to learn from other ideologies", Dr. Haidt?). People in such cultures are probably familiar with the proper preparation of such meat, and would therefore know how to do it safely. Their culinary practices have been through the filter of long experience with dog meat, and so are more likely to be safe than those some American suburban family which is used to buying USDA-inspected Grade A meat from the store.
 
* '''"a family whose dog is killed by a car, so they dismember the body and cook it for dinner"''': There are all kinds of flaws with this as an example supporting Haidt's point. First of all, some cultures ''do'' eat dog meat (what was that about liberals believing "that we have nothing to learn from other ideologies", Dr. Haidt?). People in such cultures are probably familiar with the proper preparation of such meat, and would therefore know how to do it safely. Their culinary practices have been through the filter of long experience with dog meat, and so are more likely to be safe than those some American suburban family which is used to buying USDA-inspected Grade A meat from the store.
  
Most (how many?) of the respondents agreed that the actions were "morally wrong" although "nobody was harmed". (Is it really fair to say that "nobody was harmed" in a hypothetical example where the risks aren't even discussed? Would it be "morally wrong" to drive a child-filled schoolbus at 90 MPH towards a cliff, as long as you slam on the brakes in time to prevent it from actually going over?)
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Most (how many?) of the respondents agreed that the actions were "morally wrong" although "nobody was harmed". (Is it really fair to say that "nobody was harmed" in a hypothetical example where the risks aren't even discussed? Would it be "morally wrong" to drive a child-filled schoolbus at 90 MPH towards a cliff, as long as you slam on the brakes in time to prevent it from actually going over? Also, Haidt is using a rather narrow definition of "harm" here, and not one which is consistent with the liberal position.)
  
 
In any case, Haidt draws the following conclusions:
 
In any case, Haidt draws the following conclusions:
 
* "'''when gut feelings are present, dispassionate reasoning is rare'''", and people will exert great efforts "to fabricate harmful consequences that could justify their gut-based condemnation."
 
* "'''when gut feelings are present, dispassionate reasoning is rare'''", and people will exert great efforts "to fabricate harmful consequences that could justify their gut-based condemnation."
** There is nothing wrong with this, on the face of it. Haidt further concludes "If people want to reach a conclusion, they can usually find a way to do so. The Democrats have historically failed to grasp this rule, choosing uninspiring and aloof candidates who thought that policy arguments were forms of persuasion." So now we're back in the territory where Haidt could be offering suggestions to make the liberal message more viscerally appealing -- although one might almost think he is ''criticizing'' the Democrats for using "policy arguments" -- he must be using a different meaning of the phrase than I'm aware of, because calling something "morally wrong/right" is also a policy argument, it's just not one based in ''rationality''.
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** There is nothing wrong with this statement, on the face of it. Haidt further concludes "If people want to reach a conclusion, they can usually find a way to do so. The Democrats have historically failed to grasp this rule, choosing uninspiring and aloof candidates who thought that policy arguments were forms of persuasion." So now we're back in the territory where Haidt could be offering suggestions to make the liberal message more viscerally appealing -- although one might almost think he is ''criticizing'' the Democrats for using "policy arguments" -- he must be using a different meaning of the phrase than I'm aware of, because calling something "morally wrong/right" is also a policy argument, it's just not one based in ''rationality''.
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** The obvious conclusion from Haidt's statements that "there is no rational way to explain these laws", plus the hypothesis that they were based on what actions the lawmakers at the time happened to find "disgusting", would seem to be that making laws based on what you find disgusting is kind of stupid.
 
** One is forced to conclude that he is saying that Dems need to use fewer rational arguments and more appeals to emotion in their arguments. While this might be more successful at grabbing conservative ears, wouldn't it also be somewhat ''dishonest''? And from a purely amoral/strategic point of view, wouldn't this be allowing the terms of the argument to be determined by conservatives, who specialize in such arguments and have staked out their territory almost exclusively on the basis of whether it can be phrased in such emotionally-appealing, simple, good-vs.-evil terms – playing on their field, as it were, and into their hands? (For my money, though, the "honesty" factor is more important than which side is more compelling.)
 
** One is forced to conclude that he is saying that Dems need to use fewer rational arguments and more appeals to emotion in their arguments. While this might be more successful at grabbing conservative ears, wouldn't it also be somewhat ''dishonest''? And from a purely amoral/strategic point of view, wouldn't this be allowing the terms of the argument to be determined by conservatives, who specialize in such arguments and have staked out their territory almost exclusively on the basis of whether it can be phrased in such emotionally-appealing, simple, good-vs.-evil terms – playing on their field, as it were, and into their hands? (For my money, though, the "honesty" factor is more important than which side is more compelling.)
 
* "'''the moral domain varies across cultures'''" – to which my gut reaction is "Well DUHHH", followed by the similarly-obvious thought that this is exactly why ''morality'' (i.e. any single subculture's idea of what is good or bad) cannot be used as a basis for national policy in a multicultural society. Duhhh.
 
* "'''the moral domain varies across cultures'''" – to which my gut reaction is "Well DUHHH", followed by the similarly-obvious thought that this is exactly why ''morality'' (i.e. any single subculture's idea of what is good or bad) cannot be used as a basis for national policy in a multicultural society. Duhhh.
 
** Haidt adds that the definition of "morality as being about justice, rights, and human welfare worked perfectly for the college students": the fact that the better-educated segment of Haidt's sample would think this seems like another rather blinding clue as to where the truth lies. Given exposure to only one set of values, those values become internalized in ways that aren't really analyzable; given exposure to multiple cultures and multiple sets of values, one realizes that the underlying commonality is exactly that: ''preventing harm to society and its individual members''.
 
** Haidt adds that the definition of "morality as being about justice, rights, and human welfare worked perfectly for the college students": the fact that the better-educated segment of Haidt's sample would think this seems like another rather blinding clue as to where the truth lies. Given exposure to only one set of values, those values become internalized in ways that aren't really analyzable; given exposure to multiple cultures and multiple sets of values, one realizes that the underlying commonality is exactly that: ''preventing harm to society and its individual members''.
** Haidt's final conclusion from this is that "'''morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way.'''" First of all, he misrepresents the liberal position, or at least my understanding of it, which is that morality is (as I just said) about preventing harm to society and its members. Binding groups together and supporting essential institutions are both part of that goal. Haidt seems to be tying to slip those goals in as being something that is beyond rational analysis and incompatible with the value of "preventing harm", but they absolutely are not.
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** Haidt's final conclusion from this is that "'''morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way.'''" First of all, '''this is a profound mischaracterization of the liberal position''', and one which is worth looking at more closely.
** Where we might differ is that I would say "if an institution can't be shown to be valuable to society in some way, then who cares if it crumbles?" and Haidt might claim that it should be preserved anyway. If he were to say this, however, I think the burden of proof would be on him.
 
** I would also add that the conservatives, when in power in Congress, showed absolutely no compunction about dismantling many institutions whose value was easily demonstrable. Nobody who is a Reagan/Gingrich/Bush republican has any business complaining about their institutions being threatened by liberals. If you go using your worthless-to-me institutions and customs as justification for stupid shit, then your institutions and customs have lost my sympathy.
 
  
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====liberal morality====
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The liberal position on morality can be characterized as being (as I said earlier) about preventing harm – ultimately to individuals, but this includes preventing harm to the society (and its structures) upon which individuals depend. Sometimes the good of an institution comes into conflict with the good of individuals, and then it is necessary to weigh the two sides in that conflict.
  
More Haidt:<blockquote>Conservative positions on gays, guns, god, and immigration must be understood as means to achieve one kind of morally ordered society.</blockquote>They might work for a completely ''monolithic'' society, but that would be unacceptable (and downright un-[[wikipedia:Melting pot|American]], to put it in emotional terms). If you want to do your little experiments in medieval social thinking, that's fine -- liberal tolerance allows for different ways, and perhaps we can learn from your experience. Just keep them out of my face, okay?
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Haidt would have us believe that this equation is not subject to rational analysis. Anyone who says that is automatically suspect, because what do you do when different people reach different "non-analyzable" conclusions? What is the rule here -- if it's an institution, then it is sacred and inviolable? Would Haidt agree, then, that the institution of [[al Qaeda]] should be left alone, because "it works for them"? How about the Mafia?
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Nor do liberals always decide in favor of the individual, any more than conservatives invariably favor institutions. Who was upset when the Gingrich Congress dismantled the [[Office of Technology Assessment]]? Who was upset when Bush kept passing laws which decimated the [[US Constitution|Constitution]] (surely a "group binding" document if there ever was one), and when the [[109th US Congress|109th Congress]] violated procedures which gutted the effectiveness of that institution? Which political party has spent the last 25 years trying to decimate the federal government, upon which all but the richest of us ultimately depend for our safety and well-being? (Hint: not liberals or Democrats.)
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These are all matters of disagreement ''which can be resolved by rational discussion'' of the various merits and costs &ndash; to society and to individuals &ndash; of each possible action.
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====conservative morality====
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Haidt continues:
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<blockquote>Conservative positions on gays, guns, god, and immigration must be understood as means to achieve one kind of morally ordered society.</blockquote>They might work for a completely ''monolithic'' society, but not for a multicultural society with many different roots and "moral" systems. (It would also be downright un-[[wikipedia:Melting pot|American]], to put it in emotional terms.) If you want to experiment in medieval social thinking, that's fine -- liberal tolerance allows for different ways, and perhaps we can learn from your experience -- but don't go trying to reshape society in your image, because it's not an image we like or accept.
  
 
<blockquote>When Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop psychology they err, they alienate, and they earn the label "elitist."</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>When Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop psychology they err, they alienate, and they earn the label "elitist."</blockquote>
* '''they err''': he doesn't show how, unless he's referring to his misrepresentations of liberalism's view of morality. Liberalism is the ideology which ''supports'' his contention that different cultures should be allowed to have their little ways; conservatism is far more the enemy of that idea.
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* '''they err''': he doesn't show how, unless he's referring to his misrepresentations of liberalism's view of morality. What explanations is he referring to, and how are they wrong?
 
* '''elitist''': Anyone frequenting [[En Tequila Es Verdad|this blog]] should know that we wear that label proudly. If "[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elitism elitism]" is rule by an elite, and "[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elite elite]" is "a group of persons who by virtue of position or education exercise much power or influence", I don't see anything so terrible about that -- as long as the "elite" rise to the top as part of a ''meritocracy'' rather than by some sort of class or in-group system.
 
* '''elitist''': Anyone frequenting [[En Tequila Es Verdad|this blog]] should know that we wear that label proudly. If "[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elitism elitism]" is rule by an elite, and "[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elite elite]" is "a group of persons who by virtue of position or education exercise much power or influence", I don't see anything so terrible about that -- as long as the "elite" rise to the top as part of a ''meritocracy'' rather than by some sort of class or in-group system.
  

Revision as of 19:01, 18 June 2009