Difference between revisions of "2008-09-09 What Makes People Vote Republican/woozle"

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(→‎Haidt in India: rewrites & tweaks)
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* A '''[[wikipedia:Émile Durkheim|Durkheimian]] society''' is "not ... an agreement among individuals but ... something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy."
 
* A '''[[wikipedia:Émile Durkheim|Durkheimian]] society''' is "not ... an agreement among individuals but ... something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy."
  
Haidt again casually slips in some assumptions, i.e. that a Millian society is ''not'' capable of finding ways to live together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and avoiding social exploitation. News flash to Haidt: a society based on social contracts does these things pretty well, too. Probably better. It's kind of like the difference between an evolved use of tools (e.g. a bird creating a particular type of nest out of locally available materials, after millions of years of evolution in an environment containing those materials) and a human designing a new tool after applying a little rational analysis to a mechanical problem. The birds do a damn fine job with their nests, but we can build houses and skyscrapers and automobiles and spaceships -- and if we really wanted a bird's nest, we could build that too.
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Haidt again casually slips in some assumptions, i.e. that a Millian society is ''not'' capable of finding ways to live together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other's selfishness, and avoiding social exploitation.
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'''News flash to Haidt''': a society based on social contracts does these things pretty well, too. Probably better. It's kind of like the difference between an evolved use of tools (e.g. a bird creating a particular type of nest out of locally available materials, after millions of years of evolution in an environment containing those materials) and a human designing a new tool after applying a little rational analysis to a mechanical problem. The birds do a damn fine job with their nests, but we can build houses and skyscrapers and automobiles and spaceships -- and if we really wanted a bird's nest, we could build that too.
  
 
What, then, we are left to wonder, is the advantage of the second society over the first? Well, apparently
 
What, then, we are left to wonder, is the advantage of the second society over the first? Well, apparently
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<blockquote>A Durkheimian society at its best would be a stable network composed of many nested and overlapping groups that socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures. A Durkheimian society would value self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one's groups over concerns for outgroups.</blockquote>
 
<blockquote>A Durkheimian society at its best would be a stable network composed of many nested and overlapping groups that socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures. A Durkheimian society would value self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one's groups over concerns for outgroups.</blockquote>
One of the major problems with conservatives is that they seem to assume that without that sort of rigid stricture, this sort of decadence would inevitably occur.
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One of the major problems with conservatives is that they seem to assume that without that sort of rigid stricture, most people would give in to such impulses, and society would collapse.
  
Actually, they don't assume; they state it as gospel truth, and continue stating it despite the voluminous evidence to the contrary. I suppose they're just "protecting their institutions" at the expense of the truth, but, you know, honesty is kind of important. If an institution can't survive exposure to the truth, then what kind of
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Actually, they don't merely "assume" (assumptions can be corrected); they state it as an unquestionable truth, and continue stating it despite the voluminous evidence to the contrary. I suppose they're just "protecting their institutions" at the expense of the truth, but, you know, honesty is kind of important. If an institution can't survive exposure to the truth, then what good is it anyway? How is it helping society? If it is helping somehow, ''how can you tell?''
  
Experience shows that this, too, is nonsense... except possibly among those raised with conservative values. Perhaps they ''would'' be better in an enclave -- but I'm sure as hell not putting up with that kind of external rigidity in ''my'' life, and I feel quite confident that any children I raise will be better off without it -- as will the society into which they mature.
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Experience shows that this, too, is nonsense... except possibly among those raised with conservative values. Perhaps the conservative mental wiring is such that they ''do'' need this sort of external rigidity to keep them in line &ndash; but I'm sure as hell not putting up with it in ''my'' life, and I feel quite confident that any children I raise will be better off without it, as will the society into which they mature.
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I also doubt very much that those who argue for such strictures are saying "Please, I need more rigidity in my life so I won't do bad stuff and hurt people!"; they generally seem much more interested in seeing ''other'' people thusly constrained. Conversely, liberal philosophy waits until someone actually behaves badly before constraining them, and even (gasp) attempts to take non-punitive corrective measures before this happens, minimizing the need for artificial restraint.
  
 
Haidt then goes on to make the (more or less obvious) point that the Durkheimian society relies on those ever-popular [[5 pillars of morality|Pillars]] #3-5, and that his research confirms that this pattern matches that of conservatism -- and this is the paragraph which [[2009-05-31 Why do people persist in voting Republican|Barone]] has quoted.
 
Haidt then goes on to make the (more or less obvious) point that the Durkheimian society relies on those ever-popular [[5 pillars of morality|Pillars]] #3-5, and that his research confirms that this pattern matches that of conservatism -- and this is the paragraph which [[2009-05-31 Why do people persist in voting Republican|Barone]] has quoted.
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====the 5 pillars====
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Haidt's subsequent points rely heavily on acceptance of the "[[5 pillars of morality|5 pillars]]" idea (which asserts that liberals are largely insensitive to 3 of the 5 pillars &ndash; "Ingroup/Loyalty", "Authority/Respect", and "Purity/Sanctity" &ndash; while conservatives value all 5), so a review of the problems with this argument is in order.
  
His subsequent points rely heavily on acceptance of the "5 pillars" argument. The problems with this argument (which asserts that liberals are largely insensitive to 3 of the 5 pillars -- "Ingroup/Loyalty", "Authority/Respect", and "Purity/Sanctity -- while conservatives value all 5) are numerous, and include the following:
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In a nutshell, the observation can't be true; liberals plainly have as much interest in the 3 "conservative" pillars, to the extent that Haidt defines them (which isn't much):
* Liberals are generally far ''more'' concerned about purity of environmental conditions than are conservatives. Food is a good example: filtered water, organic foods, avoidance of over-processing, and avoidance of synthetic ingredients in food are all very much ''liberal'' causes, ignored or even disparaged by conservatives.
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* '''purity''': Liberals are generally far ''more'' concerned about purity ''of environmental conditions'' than are conservatives. Food is a good example: filtered water, organic foods, avoidance of over-processing, and avoidance of synthetic ingredients in food are all very much ''liberal'' causes, ignored or even disparaged by conservatives.
* Liberals are every bit as loyal to their in-groups (friends), although their criteria for forming those groups may be different from those used by conservatives; conservatives seem to form loyal relationships based on established institutions (marriage, church, the workplace), while liberals are more focused on personal empathy
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* '''sanctity''': The idea of certain natural spaces being "sacred" is also something embraced by the more [[mystical]] element of liberalism (and definitely not by conservatives)... not to mention protecting the "sanctity" of natural beauty by preventing pollution.
* Liberals often display immense respect (bordering on worship) of certain individuals, but the processes by which they ''choose'' which individuals to favor thusly are probably somewhat different from the processes used by conservatives. At a guess: conservatives seem to give respect, or deem individuals worthy of authority, based solely on position within a strict hierarchy; liberals tend to be more willing to independently evaluate individuals for their contribution to society, regardless (indeed, often in ''spite'') of hierarchical position.
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* '''ingroup/loyalty''': Liberals are every bit as loyal to their in-groups, although their criteria for forming those groups may be different from those used by conservatives; conservatives seem to form loyal relationships based on established institutions (marriage, church, the workplace), while liberals are more focused on personal empathy
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* '''authority/respect''': Liberals often display immense respect (bordering on worship) of certain individuals, but again the criteria and processes by which they choose which individuals to favor thusly are probably somewhat different from the processes used by conservatives. At a guess: conservatives seem to give respect, or deem individuals worthy of authority, based solely on position within a strict hierarchy, while liberals tend to be more willing to independently evaluate individuals for their contribution to society, regardless (indeed, often in ''spite'') of hierarchical position.
  
It seems clear that Haidt must be using very specific definitions of those three pillars; obvious unanswered questions are (1) what are those definitions, (2) how did he arrive at them, and (3) why did he choose to exclude any other possible definitions (such as those used by liberals)?
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It seems clear that Haidt must be using very specific definitions of those three pillars in order to have overlooked the liberal interests in them; obvious unanswered questions are (1) what are those definitions, (2) how did he arrive at them, and (3) why did he choose to exclude any other possible definitions (such as those used by liberals)?
  
Beyond that, there is the more glaring and significant question of ''why these three "conservative pillars" should matter if not for the benefit they may bring to society?''
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Beyond that, there is the more glaring and significant question of ''why these three "conservative pillars" should matter, if not for the benefit they may bring to society?''
  
Other questions rear their heads -- there are a lot of potential pillars not mentioned (honesty, integrity, honor, effectiveness, talent); how did Haidt arrive at just those five as being relevant?
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Other questions rear their heads -- there are a lot of potential morality-components not mentioned (honesty, integrity, honor, effectiveness, talent, creativity, competence...); how did Haidt arrive at just those five as being relevant?
  
 
Haidt concludes this section by stating:
 
Haidt concludes this section by stating:
<blockquote>The resulting music may sound beautiful to other Democrats, but it sounds thin and incomplete to many of the swing voters that left the party in the 1980s, and whom the Democrats must recapture if they want to produce a lasting political realignment.</blockquote>To the extent that this is a criticism of the Democratic point of view, it is a stupid argument (do you want the medicine that tastes good, or the one that works?); to the extent that it is criticism of Democratic marketing, it is feeble and ought to be something that conservatives would find insulting ("Dem solutions may actually be better than those of the Cons, but Cons will keep using theirs until Dems can entice them with the right color of paint").
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<blockquote>The resulting music may sound beautiful to other Democrats, but it sounds thin and incomplete to many of the swing voters that left the party in the 1980s, and whom the Democrats must recapture if they want to produce a lasting political realignment.</blockquote>To the extent that this is a criticism of the Democratic point of view, it is a stupid argument (do you want the medicine that tastes good, or the one that works?). To the extent that it is criticism of Democratic marketing, it is feeble; if I were a conservative, I would find it insulting: "Dem philosophy may actually work much better than that of the Cons, but Cons will shun it anyway until Dems wrap it in a shiny package with a pretty ribbon on top."
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Sadly, Cons don't seem to have any problem with being insulted this way, or perhaps (as seems more likely) don't look beyond the surface to realize they're being conned; Barone references Haidt with apparent approval, and he seems to completely overlook the fact that Haidt is calling him and his ilk gullible fools who will take splash over substance every time, as long as the splash has the right symbols on it (family! church! country!).
  
Sadly, apparently they do not; Barone's referencing of Haidt seems entirely approving, and he seems to completely overlook the fact that Haidt is calling him and his ilk gullible fools who will take splash over substance every time, as long as the splash has the right symbols on it (family! church! country!).
 
 
===Haidt and The Political Brain===
 
===Haidt and The Political Brain===
 
In the next section, Haidt reaches the end of the science he had to present, and keeps going -- not realizing that he has run past the end of what little credibility he had. ''Republicans have become the party of the sacred,'' says he, ''and Democrats the party of the profane -- the secular -- the material.''
 
In the next section, Haidt reaches the end of the science he had to present, and keeps going -- not realizing that he has run past the end of what little credibility he had. ''Republicans have become the party of the sacred,'' says he, ''and Democrats the party of the profane -- the secular -- the material.''

Revision as of 22:06, 18 June 2009