Difference between revisions of "Straw Vulcan"
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==About== | ==About== | ||
| − | The [[straw Vulcan]] is a [[straw man]] characterization of [[rationality]] that is used as an argument for the superiority of supposedly | + | The [[straw Vulcan]] is a [[straw man]] characterization of [[rationality]] that is used as an argument for the superiority of supposedly [[rational]] methods of thinking. |
| − | It is a [[conceptual fallacy]] in that it misconceptualizes the idea of rationality by making the assumption that rationality can only operate on the basis of certainties, and that it is therefore irrational to trust a hunch or feeling | + | It is a [[conceptual fallacy]] in that it misconceptualizes the idea of rationality by making the assumption that rationality can only operate on the basis of certainties, and that it is therefore irrational to trust a hunch or feeling – even if one has extensive past experience indicating that hunches in similar circumstances are reliable. |
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| + | It also depends somewhat on the [[calmness-rationality fallacy]], in which an appearance of calmness (especially in the face of potentially upsetting information) is taken as indicating greater rationality. | ||
==Links== | ==Links== | ||
===Reference=== | ===Reference=== | ||
Latest revision as of 10:56, 13 July 2018
About
The straw Vulcan is a straw man characterization of rationality that is used as an argument for the superiority of supposedly rational methods of thinking.
It is a conceptual fallacy in that it misconceptualizes the idea of rationality by making the assumption that rationality can only operate on the basis of certainties, and that it is therefore irrational to trust a hunch or feeling – even if one has extensive past experience indicating that hunches in similar circumstances are reliable.
It also depends somewhat on the calmness-rationality fallacy, in which an appearance of calmness (especially in the face of potentially upsetting information) is taken as indicating greater rationality.