Difference between revisions of "Voting"
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===Video=== | ===Video=== | ||
* '''2007-06-09''' [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EowKalRT3lc changing the ROMs of a Nedap e-voting computer in 60 seconds]: the ROMs control how the machine works; a thorough visual examination of the system wouldn't necessarily be able to detect the swap. Voting machines can be designed to prevent this, however, by including a nonvolatile memory area containing an encrypted hash of the authorized ROM contents. At boot time, before loading the ROMs, the machine would compare the hash of the actual ROMs with the stored hash; if they did not match, it would refuse to boot and would display an error message alerting operators to the problem. '''Any machine which does ''not'' have a solution like this built into it, though, is therefore vulnerable to this kind of swap.''' | * '''2007-06-09''' [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EowKalRT3lc changing the ROMs of a Nedap e-voting computer in 60 seconds]: the ROMs control how the machine works; a thorough visual examination of the system wouldn't necessarily be able to detect the swap. Voting machines can be designed to prevent this, however, by including a nonvolatile memory area containing an encrypted hash of the authorized ROM contents. At boot time, before loading the ROMs, the machine would compare the hash of the actual ROMs with the stored hash; if they did not match, it would refuse to boot and would display an error message alerting operators to the problem. '''Any machine which does ''not'' have a solution like this built into it, though, is therefore vulnerable to this kind of swap.''' | ||
| + | * '''2006-10-11''' [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B05wPomCjEY voting computer tempest attack]: The Nedap ES3B voting computer leaks a signal, receivable at up to 25m, which can be decoded to detect what votes are being cast. 90% of all Dutch votes are cast using that computer, according to the video. | ||
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- 2007-06-09 changing the ROMs of a Nedap e-voting computer in 60 seconds: the ROMs control how the machine works; a thorough visual examination of the system wouldn't necessarily be able to detect the swap. Voting machines can be designed to prevent this, however, by including a nonvolatile memory area containing an encrypted hash of the authorized ROM contents. At boot time, before loading the ROMs, the machine would compare the hash of the actual ROMs with the stored hash; if they did not match, it would refuse to boot and would display an error message alerting operators to the problem. Any machine which does not have a solution like this built into it, though, is therefore vulnerable to this kind of swap.
- 2006-10-11 voting computer tempest attack: The Nedap ES3B voting computer leaks a signal, receivable at up to 25m, which can be decoded to detect what votes are being cast. 90% of all Dutch votes are cast using that computer, according to the video.