Difference between revisions of "2006-04-16 A General Misunderstanding"
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| − | + | * '''Date''': [[when posted::2006-04-16]] ([[date posted::2006/04/16]]) | |
| − | + | * '''Author''' [[author::Michael DeLong]] | |
| − | + | * '''Source''' [[source::New York Times]] | |
| − | + | * '''Topics''' [[topic::Donald Rumsfeld]] [[topic::US-Iraq/war/invasion]] [[topic::Ahmad Chalabi]] | |
| − | + | * '''Link''': [[URL::http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/opinion/16delong.html]] | |
| − | + | * '''Title''' [[title::A General Misunderstanding]] | |
| − | + | * '''Summary''': [[summary::A defense of Rumsfeld by one of his former generals: {{fmt/quote|...that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. General Franks drafted it and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.}}]] | |
| − | + | ==Excerpt== | |
| + | <blockquote> | ||
<p>This is why the much-repeated claims that [[Donald Rumsfeld|Mr. Rumsfeld]] didn't "give us enough troops" in [[US invasion of Iraq|Iraq]] ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.</p> | <p>This is why the much-repeated claims that [[Donald Rumsfeld|Mr. Rumsfeld]] didn't "give us enough troops" in [[US invasion of Iraq|Iraq]] ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.</p> | ||
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<p>But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. General Franks drafted it and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.</p> | <p>But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. General Franks drafted it and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.</p> | ||
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Latest revision as of 19:30, 10 February 2025
- Date: 2006-04-16 (2006/04/16)
- Author Michael DeLong
- Source New York Times
- Topics Donald Rumsfeld US-Iraq/war/invasion Ahmad Chalabi
- Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/opinion/16delong.html
- Title A General Misunderstanding
- Summary: A defense of Rumsfeld by one of his former generals: «...that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. General Franks drafted it and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.»
Excerpt
This is why the much-repeated claims that Mr. Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also – collectively – made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi Army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam Hussein was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. General Franks drafted it and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.